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ABSTRACT 
 
A field—new technologies and human rights or, more broadly, law and technology—is in 
the process of being framed. Should the European Court of Human Rights be seen as part 
of that process? To find out, we searched the Court’s case-law using HUDOC, a database 
on the Council of Europe website which contains both judgments and admissibility 
decisions. We entered 155 keywords, all in English, and in this article we report and 
analyse what we found. The overall conclusion is twofold: first, it is too early to attempt a 
complete characterisation of the Court’s position on new technologies; and second, the 
Court is however ‘one to watch’. 
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1. Introduction 
  
In April 2007 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (‘the Court’) 
advised Natallie Evans that the rules governing assisted reproduction in the United 
Kingdom (UK) were compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the 
Convention’ or ECHR).1 For Evans this meant that all hope of having a child who would 
be genetically related to her was extinguished; for Evans’ ex-fiancé, who had triggered 
the case by refusing consent to the use or continued storage of the embryos, it was a 
guarantee that he was not going to be made a father against his wishes; and for the UK 
government it was a sign that its pioneering legislation, the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990,
2
 was human-rights worthy.  
Eighteen months later, the government fared less well in Strasbourg. This time, in 
a case concerning the indefinite retention, without consent, of the fingerprints and DNA 
samples and profiles of individuals who had been acquitted or whose cases had been 
discontinued, the Court held for the applicants, S and Marper, and against the UK 
government.
3
 Five years earlier, in a case concerning disclosure of CCTV footage to the 
media, the Court had advised that ‘private life’, protected by Article 8 ECHR, was ‘a 
broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition’.4 Another aspect of Article 8— 
‘correspondence’—came up in Copland v United Kingdom,5 where the Court held that 
the collection and storage of personal information relating to the applicant’s email and 
internet usage raised issues concerning the right to respect for correspondence and private 
                                                                
1
 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, ETS 5. 
2
 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK) (as amended), available at: 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/cts/acts1990/ukpga_19900037_en_1 [last accessed 23 August 2010].  
3
 S & Marper v United Kingdom 48 EHRR 50 at para. 112. 
4
 Peck v United Kingdom 2003-I; 36 EHRR 41 at para. 57. 
5
 45 EHRR 37. Monitoring of telephone usage was also in issue. 
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life. Complaints concerning the secret surveillance regime applicable in the UK, have 
also come before the Court in recent years,
6
 continuing a trend that dates back to 1984 
and the case of Malone v United Kingdom.
7
  
That gives us a tally of six cases with a link to new technologies in less than seven 
years. Is that in some way significant? A cluster of cases can signal a trend, and it can 
also have a profound impact. Think for example of Soobramoney,
8
 Grootboom
9
 and 
Treatment Action Campaign,
10
 a trio of decisions by the South African Constitutional 
Court which ignited new thinking on the justiciability of economic, social and cultural 
rights. Equally, however, it would be foolish to think of case law as a context where 
quantity is always a signpost of something significant. Still, the Strasbourg cluster— 
Evans v United Kingdom,
11
 S & Marper,
12
 Peck,
13
 Copland,
14
 Liberty and Others
15
 and 
Kennedy
16—was enough for us to want to take a closer look at the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights. We had a hypothesis we wanted to test: a field – new 
technologies and human rights (or, more broadly, law and technology) – is in the process 
of being framed. The Court perhaps is part of that. And, if it is, then the Court’s case law 
ought to take its place alongside other ideas on how to tease out the human rights 
challenges of new technologies and how to confront them. 
                                                                
6
 See respectively Kennedy v United Kingdom Application No. 26839/05, 18 May 2010; Liberty and Others 
v United Kingdom Application No. 58243/00, 1 July 2008.  
7
 A 82 (1984); 7 EHRR 14. 
8
 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal 1998 (1) SALR 765 (CC). 
9
 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootbroom, 2001 (1) SALR 46 (CC). 
10
;Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SALR 721 (CC).  
11
 2007-IV; 46 EHRR 34. 
12
 Supra n. 3. 
13
 Supra n. 4. 
14
 Supra n. 5. 
15
 Supra n. 6. 
16  
Supra n. 6. 
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2. What We Did 
 
Would this hypothesis stand up to scrutiny? A field clearly is being framed, so the 
question is: should the European Court of Human Rights be seen as part of that? To find 
out, we searched the Court’s case law using HUDOC—a database, on the Council of 
Europe website,
17
 which contains both judgments and admissibility decisions. We entered 
155 keywords entered, all in English,
18
 drawn from the glossary, index and contents 
pages of recent English-language publications associated with Science and Technology 
Studies (STS),
19
 and the equivalent pages in recent English-language publications on new 
technologies and human rights.
20
  
Throughout the search we maintained a light touch on the question of what counts 
as a ‘new technology’. The word ‘new’ in ‘new technology’ has a cluster of 
competitors—from innovative to emerging, modern, high, novel and, even, 
revolutionary—and we did not want the search to founder on the pros and cons of 
different options or indeed on what was, and was not, a synonym of ‘new’. More 
importantly, a definition might have distorted the ‘human rights angle’. We did not 
expect that the Court’s case law would (or could) cover all aspects of the relationship 
                                                                
17 
Available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-Law/Hudoc/Hudoc+database/ [last 
accessed 23 August 2010]. The cut-off date for the search was 1 June 2010. 
18 
Judgments are in English and French or, where the cases are less important, English or French. Our 
keywords were in English which meant that cases from the latter group reported in French fell outside the 
search. We made one exception to this rule: Tătar  v Romania, infra n. 81, where the judgment, following 
from an admissibility decision in English, is available only in French.    
19
 Restivo, Science, Technology, and Society: An Encyclopedia (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005); Smith and Tolfree, Roadmapping Emergent Technologies (Leicester: Troubador Publishing, 2009). 
20 
Brownsword, Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008); Brownsword and Yeung (eds), Regulating Technologies: Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and 
Technological Fixes (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008); Francioni (ed), Biotechnologies and International 
Human Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007); Murphy (ed), New Technologies and Human Rights, 
Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, vol XVII/2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).  
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between human rights and new technologies. Nonetheless, it did not seem right to 
prioritise a definition of new technologies if in so doing we might obscure some aspect of 
the rights-technologies’ relationship. We were, for instance, conscious that human rights 
have the capacity to alter, delay or stop-dead a technology whilst it is still in research and 
development (R&D).
21
 At the blue skies stage, too, human rights can have an effect: 
think, for example, of the difference made by respect for freedom for scientific 
research—indeed, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
describes that freedom as ‘indispensable’ for scientific research.22 Human rights also 
have the capacity to ‘reinvent’ innovation. By this we mean that rights can shape 
perspectives on the needs, benefits and priorities that drive innovation in the first place. 
Rights can also shape who innovates: there is evidence that they are part of claims-
making by individuals and families who are ‘genetically at risk’ and want to be part of 
R&D—to be part, in other words, of new kinds of research endeavours, where they 
contribute actively to knowledge about their genetic illnesses, rather than being merely 
the recipients, non-recipients or, indeed, the opponents of science and technology.
23
  
If we turn to extant ‘new technologies’, further problems come to light. In 
particular, new applications of extant technologies—whether unexpected or striven-for, 
and whether market, user or mixed-innovation—can be the cause of new human-rights 
controversy, new acceptability or both. Side-effects, misconduct and accidents tend to 
                                                                
21
 For a set of proposals on how to regulate emerging technologies, see Mandel, ‘Regulating Emerging 
Technologies’ (2009) 1 Law, Innovation and Technology 75. 
22
 Article 15(3), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, 993 UNTS 3 
(ICESCR).  
23
 See the examples cited in Rose and Novas, ‘Biological Citizenship’, in A Ong and SJ Collier (eds), 
Global Assemblages (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005) 439.  
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have profound effects too.
24
 Even the potential for new applications, however remote, 
however implausible—what we might call ‘fiction science’—can have profound effects. 
Consider for example how Dolly the sheep, the first successful attempt at cloning a 
mammal by means of nuclear transfer technology, provoked an outpouring of imagined 
applications and how these in turn must surely have played a part in the burst of law-
making around human cloning that followed soon after.  
Put succinctly, we did not look for—and did not use—a definition of ‘new 
technologies’. We did however have 155 keywords which, in turn, provided a set of 
search parameters stretching across five broad categories. Those categories were as 
follows: (i) direct references to technology or its substrate (e.g., ‘hard drive’; ‘data’);25 
(ii) affixes (e.g., ‘bio’);26 (iii) techno-vocabulary (e.g., ‘false-positives’);27 (iv) the titles 
of relevant Council of Europe treaties (e.g., the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine 1997), as well as titles and keywords from a range of other 
instruments;
28
 and (v) principles which the Strasbourg Court might reasonably be 
                                                                
24
 See, e.g., Petryna, Life Exposed: Biological Citizens after Chernobyl (Princeton NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2002).  
25
 Also Antenna; Artificial limb; Atomic; Biotechnology; Biobank; CCTV; Clone; Cytogenetics; Digital; 
Database + personal; Electronic archive; Electronic mail; Electronic tag; Enzyme; Genetic (modified/test); 
Genomic; GPS; Hard disk; Human Tissue; Implant; Forensic + fibre/DNA; Internet; Laboratory; Laser; 
Medical equipment; Microchip; Machine + privacy; Mast; Monitor; Nanotechnology; Nuclear; Neuronal; 
Pace-maker; Plasmid; Radar; Scanner; Surveillance (systems); Tazer; Transplant; and Ultrasound. 
26
 Also Micro-; Macro-; Cyber; Auto; Techno; and E- (as, e.g., in e-commerce). 
27
 Also Artificial Intelligence; Automated; Biometric; Bioterrorism; Biological + Terrorism; Calibrate; 
Computerised; Cloning; Distance Learning; Energy + Alternative/Clean/Green/Thermal/Wind; 
Experiment/ation; Hybrid; Intubation; Inventor; Graft; Optical; Environmentally Friendly; Electronic; 
Magnetic-resonance imaging (MRI); Mechanised; Patent(ee); Technology; Technologies; Technological; 
Recombinant; Reconnaissance; Respirator; Scientific Progress; Scientific Uncertainty; Surgical; Solar; 
Sustainable; Ventilator; and Xenotransplantation.  
28
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the 
Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997, ETS 164 
(Oviedo Convention). Four Additional Protocols have been adopted: on the prohibition of cloning human 
beings 1998, ETS 168; on transplantation 2002, ETS 186; on biomedical research 2004, ETS 195; and on 
genetic testing for health purposes 2008, ETS 203. The other Council of Europe instruments used as 
keywords were: Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
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expected to invoke in cases concerning new technologies (e.g., the principle of respect for 
human dignity).
29
  
This article reports on what we found in the Court’s case law using the above 
search method. It reports, too, on what we didn’t find. The structure is as follows: Section 
3 explains why we embarked on the study, and Sections 4 and 5 report the findings—
Section 4 deals with what we did not find, and Section 5 describes and discusses what is 
in the case law.  
 
3. A Fool’s Errand? 
 
Already, some readers will have determined that a hypothesis about new technologies 
and the European Court of Human Rights is one thing but pursuing it is a different, less 
defensible matter. That is fair enough: there are a number of reasons why the study we 
conducted may seem premature, even peculiar. For starters, although a range of new 
technologies have been taken up by human rights activists, the field we are calling ‘new 
technologies and human rights’ is not widely recognised.30 And, where it is recognised, 
human rights often seems to share the ground (and potentially compete) with bioethics. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Personal Data 1981, ETS 108 (Data Protection Convention), and its Additional Protocol regarding 
Supervisory Authorities and Transborder Flow 2001, ETS 181; Convention on Cybercrime 2001, ETS 185, 
and its Additional Protocol 2003, ETS 189; European Agreement on the Exchange of Therapeutic 
Substances of Human Origin 1958, ETS 26, and its Additional Protocol 1984, ETS 109; European 
Convention for the Protection of the Audiovisual Heritage 2001, ETS 183; European Agreement on the 
Protection of Television Broadcasts 1960, ETS 34 and Protocols 1965, ETS 54 and 1983, ETS 113; 
European Convention on Transfrontier Television 1989, ETS 132. The other (non Council of Europe) 
instruments are listed infra nn. 33, 51, 52, 53, 54, 58 and 102.  
29
 Also the precautionary principle; informed consent; non-discrimination; freedom of scientific research; 
public participation; protection of the moral and material interests resulting from one’s scientific 
productions; benefit sharing; the common heritage of humankind; the self-determination of peoples; best 
interests; respect for human life; integrity of the person; freedom of expression; privacy; confidentiality; 
access to information; access to justice; and data protection.  
30
 But, as examples of early interventions, see Weeramantry, Justice Without Frontiers: Protecting Human 
Rights in the Age of Technology: Vols I and II (The Hague: Kluwer, 1997-98); UNHCHR, Expert Group on 
Human Rights and Biotechnology, ‘Conclusions’, Geneva, 24-25 January 2002.  
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There have also been difficult relationships between human rights and both intellectual 
property and trade law, as well as differences of opinion between activists and scholars 
aligned with the access to knowledge (A2K) movement and their counterparts in the 
human rights one (especially on the question of the state’s role).31  
A second problem is Europe: specifically, if what interests us is ‘who’ or ‘what’ 
within Europe is influencing the emerging field of law, rights and technology, it is not 
obvious that the Strasbourg Court has the best claim. So, for example, the Oviedo 
Convention and its Protocols, and the Data Protection Convention,
32
 facilitate claims-
making by the Court’s parent organisation, the Council of Europe. Another contender 
would be the European Patent Office (EPO), which administers the European Patent 
Convention—an instrument which provides that patents will not be granted for inventions 
the exploitation of which would be contrary to ordre public or morality.
33
  
Perhaps, however, the strongest case is that of the European Union (EU). 
Consider the evidence: the EU has signed up to public engagement with science;
34
 
endorsed a precautionary approach
35
 (and for so doing it has been brought before a Panel 
of the WTO);
36
 appointed a European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 
                                                                
31
 For discussion of these tensions, see respectively Wüger and Cottier (eds), Genetic Engineering and the 
World Trade System, World Trade Forum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Beutz Land, 
‘Protecting Rights Online’ (2009) 34 Yale Journal of International Law 1. 
32
 Supra n. 28. Article 29 of the Oviedo Convention offers the possibility to request advisory opinions from 
the ECtHR concerning the Convention’s interpretation 
33
 Article 53(a), European Patent Convention 1973, 1065 UNTS 199.    
34
 See, e.g., its ‘Science and Society Action Portfolio’, available at:  http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-
society [last accessed 23 August 2010].  
35
 See in particular European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary 
Principle’, COM (2000) 1 final (2 February 2000) at para. 3.  
36
 EC-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, Panel Reports WT/DS291/R, 
WT/DS292/R, WTDS293/R, 29 September 2006.   
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(EGE);
37
 promoted the development of international standards for data protection;
38
 and 
issued a growing pile of directives and regulations.
39 
More generally, the fact that the 
European Community, as it then was, participated in the negotiation and signing of a 
‘core’ international human rights treaty, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities,
40
 would seem to indicate that the EU both sees itself and wants to be seen as 
an actor in the international human rights field.
41
 The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
now part of the primary law of the EU, corroborates this point; it also corroborates the 
original claim—namely, that the EU has a good case to be seen as the foremost European 
actor in the field of ‘new technologies and human rights’—in that it establishes data 
protection as an autonomous fundamental right, a move that makes it stand out amongst 
human rights instruments (including the ECHR) ‘which, for the most part, treat the 
protection of personal data as an extension of the right to privacy’.42 
To complete the sceptics’ list, the Strasbourg Court has to be brought into the 
discussion. The sceptics’ position—maintained in the face of a growing body of 
scholarship on the Court
43—is that this Court is not suitable as study site. Typically, the 
                                                                
37
 Details available at: http://ec.europa.eu/european_group_ethics/index_en.htm [last accessed 23 August 
2010].   
38
 This is a goal of ‘The Stockholm Programme: An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting the 
Citizen’ (Brussels: European Commission, 2009). 
39
 See, e.g., Directive 98/44/EC on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Innovations, [1998] OJ 
L/213/13.   
40
 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006, 189 UNTS 137 (CRPD). For an analysis of 
the role played by the EU, see de Búrca, ‘The EU in the Negotiation of the UN Disability Convention’ 
(2010) 35 European Law Review 174.  
41
 Note too that the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the Lisbon Treaty) provides for the 
accession of the EU to the ECHR. 
42
 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), ‘Data Protection in the European Union: The 
Role of National Data Protection Authorities’ (2010) at 6. 
43
 See, e.g., Harris et al., Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, 2
nd
 edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Specialist texts include: Dembour, Who Believes 
in Human Rights? Reflections on the European Convention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006); Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations 
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criticisms go as follows: why spend time studying a court whose decisions do not appear 
to build towards a system of judicially-constructed rules? Also, doesn’t the margin of 
appreciation, and the Court’s practice of balancing conflicting rights against each other or 
against competing public interests,
44
 get in the way of the ECHR being an ‘instrument of 
European public order for the protection of individual human beings’?45 Finally, in light 
of the fact that our subject-matter is ‘new technologies and human rights’, the sceptics 
may also say that the Convention is not the obvious starting-point in that it contains 
mostly civil and political rights,
46
 makes no mention of human dignity, and offers no 
explicit protection to personal data.  
The sceptics’ arguments are formidable: what, then, convinced us to go ahead 
with the study? For starters, the cluster of cases involving the UK—Evans, S & Marper, 
Peck, Copland, Liberty and Others and Kennedy—was a considerable draw, not least 
because the UK has incorporated the Convention into domestic law and its judges have 
been directed to take Strasbourg jurisprudence into account in determining questions 
concerning Convention rights.
47
 There was more to it, however, than parochialism. The 
UK is not the only Council of Europe state that sees itself as being in a race to techno-
innovate. Moreover, the EU sees itself in this way too: in the 2000 Lisbon Agenda it 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2004). 
44
 On this practice, see Mowbray, ‘A Study of the Principle of Fair Balance in the Jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 10 Human Rights Law Review 289. 
45
 Loizidou v Turkey A 310 (1995); 20 EHRR 99 at para. 93. See further Greer, supra n. 43; Krisch, ‘The 
Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’ (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 183; Letsas, ‘Two 
Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation’ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 705. 
46
 In a number of cases, including Airey v Ireland A 32 (1979); 2 EHRR 305 at para. 26, the Court has 
emphasised that ‘there is no water-tight division’ separating socio-economic rights from the rights covered 
in the Convention. See however N v United Kingdom 47 EHRR 39 at para. 44: ‘Although many of the 
rights it contains have implications of a social or economic nature, the Convention is essentially directed at 
the protection of civil and political rights.’ 
47
 Human Rights Act 1998, s 2(1).  
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vowed to use scientific research to build the most competitive global knowledge-
economy by 2010.
48
 Individual Europeans are also heavily invested in the promise of new 
technologies. Take, for example, assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs), the 
quintessential ‘hope technologies’,49 where it is clear that saying ‘no’ remains awfully 
hard even though failure rates are high and the cost—psychologically, physically and 
financially—is prohibitive.  
Separating hope from hype is far from easy however, and fear is usually close at 
hand as well. For example, if states embrace technologies as regulatory tools in the field 
of criminal justice on the grounds that they offer efficient and effective routes to manage 
crime and criminals, do we risk corroding dignity, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms? Do we—to use Roger Brownsword’s phrase—risk displacing the Rule of Law 
by the Rule of Technology?
50
 For others, the loss of human dignity is what is most 
feared, and there are others again for whom loss of ‘competitiveness’ is the primary 
worry.  
This mix of hope, hype and fear may go some way towards explaining why there 
has been a flurry of international human rights law- and policy-making on new 
technologies. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) has championed much of this law-making,
51
 generating a triumvirate of soft 
law instruments: the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 
                                                                
48
 See Lisbon European Council Presidency Conclusions (2000), available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm#a [last accessed 23 August 2010].  
49
 Franklin, Embodied Progress: A Cultural Account of Assisted Conception (London: Routledge, 1997). 
50
 Brownsword, supra n. 13 at 2. On the use of technology by state and non-state actors, see Bekou and 
Bergsmo, Mechlem, Pelsinger, and Whitty, this issue of the Human Rights Law Review. 
51
 International instruments on environmental matters—in particular, the Cartagena Protocol to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity 2000, 2226 UNTS 208, and the UNECE Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
1998, 2161 UNTS 447 (Aarhus Convention)—are also of potential interest. 
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1997, the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data 2003 and the Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 2005.
52
 Of potential relevance, too, are its 
instruments on cultural property and on the rights of indigenous persons.
53
 There has also 
been a UN Declaration on Human Cloning,
54
 and there is a UN Special Rapporteur on 
Human Rights and the Human Genome.
55
 More recently, the Human Rights Council has 
called on the Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) to report 
on best practice in the use of forensic genetics for identifying victims of serious 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.
56
 There has also been 
acknowledgement of both the ‘increasing relevance’ and ‘continued neglect’57 of the 
right to enjoy the benefit of scientific progress and its applications.
58
  
The question that arises is: has this flurry of law- and policy-making eased or, 
indeed, melted away the friction—the mix of hope, hype and fear—referred to earlier? In 
short, no, it has not. Numerous tough questions lie ahead, such as ‘[d]oes intellectual 
                                                                
52
 Available at: 
 http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=12025&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=-471.html 
[last accessed 23 August 2010]. See, in addition, the Universal Declaration on the Responsibilities of the 
Present Generations Towards Future Generations (1997).  
53
 See UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity 2001 and related instruments, notably the 
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage 2003 and the Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 2005, available at the UNESCO portal, 
ibid. See also the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2007, adopted by GA Res. 61/295, 
13 September 2007, A/RES/61/295.  
54
 GA Res. 59/280, 23 March 2005, A/RES/59/280 at para. (b), wherein ‘Member States are called upon to 
prohibit all forms of human cloning inasmuch as they are incompatible with human dignity and the 
protection of human life …’. 
55
 See ‘Human Rights and the Human Genome’, preliminary report submitted by Special Rapporteur Iulia-
Antonella Motoc, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/36 (10 July 2003); E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/38 (23 July 2004); 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/38 (14 July 2005). See also Motoc, ‘The International Law of Genetic Discrimination’: 
The Power of “Never Again”’ in Murphy, supra n. 20 at 222.  
56
 Human Rights Council Res 10\26, 9 November 2009, A/HRC/10/9.  
57
 See para. 1, Venice Statement on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its 
Applications 2009, available at: 
http://shr.aaas.org/article15/Reference_Materials/VeniceStatement_July2009.pdf [last accessed 23 August 
2010]. See further Müller, this issue of the Human Rights Law Review. 
58
 See, e.g., Article 15(1)(b), ICESCR.  
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property deserve to be treated as a fundamental right? And if it does, how does a human 
rights-inspired conception of intellectual property differ from existing rules that promote 
innovation and creativity?’59 Moreover, some of the voices raised in answer to these 
questions will take the view that law-making (and perhaps especially law-making in the 
name of human rights) is to be discouraged; that law is simply ‘“too slow” for the 
flexibility and responsiveness, not to mention anticipatory dynamism, “required” by 
modern science, technology, innovation and global competitiveness’.60  
To sum up: a cluster of cases led us to formulate a hypothesis and, for four 
reasons, investigating it seemed a good course of action. First, the UK, the jurisdiction in 
which we are based, was involved in all six of the original cases. Second, the UK is 
certainly keen on techno-innovation but it is not alone in that: other European states and 
the EU have this trait as well, and Europeans are both subject to and consumers of new 
technologies. Third, although other European actors may seem more obvious starting-
points for a study on new technologies and human rights, the ECHR and the Strasbourg 
Court are clearly the focal points for human rights at the European level. Also, 
Convention jurisprudence is a powerful force, both in contracting states and 
internationally. Fourth, and finally, the relationship between human rights and new 
technologies is one that needs to be studied, not least because there is nothing clear-cut 
about either the role of human rights in regulating such technologies or the impact on 
human rights of a take-up of technologies (including by human rights advocates 
themselves).  
                                                                
59
 Helfer, ‘The New Innovation Frontier: Intellectual Property and the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2008) 49 Harvard International Law Journal 1 at 6. 
60 Taking European Knowledge Society Seriously: Report of the Expert Group on Science and Governance 
(Luxembourg: European Commission, 2007) at 52.  
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4. What We Didn’t Find 
We did experience doubt at various points—mostly when it seemed that we might have 
more to say about what we had not found in the Court’s case law than what we had. Yet 
what is not in the Court’s case law—or isn’t there in the volume one might have hoped 
for—is not without interest. With that in mind, we use this section of the article to look at 
what is not in the case law, beginning with the Council of Europe Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine, also known as the Oviedo Convention.  
The Oviedo Convention is a treaty of the Council of Europe that sets out the 
fundamental principles applicable in day-to-day medicine as well as those applicable to 
new technologies in human biology and medicine. We had hoped that by using the 
Convention’s title as a keyword we would have a series of high-quality hits, not least 
because of the Court’s practice of referring to other international treaties, and even soft 
law, when interpreting the ECHR.
61
 Those hopes were not realised: to date, the Oviedo 
Convention has only been referred to as a relevant international legal source in the 
limited context of informed consent to medical interventions,
62
 and there is also only one 
mention of any of its Additional Protocols.
63
 The only other Council of Europe 
instruments from our keyword list that appeared in technology-centred cases were the 
Data Protection Convention and those relating to television broadcasting.
64
 Ranging 
                                                                
61
 See, e.g., Soering v United Kingdom A 161 (1989); 11 EHRR 439. 
62
 See Juhnke v Turkey 49 EHRR 24 at para. 56; Glass v United Kingdom 2004-II; 39 EHRR 341 at para. 
58; Evans v United Kingdom, supra n. 11 at para. 50; IG, MK and RH v Slovakia Application No. 15966/04, 
22 September 2009; MAK and RK v United Kingdom Application Nos. 45901/05 and 40146/06, 23 March 
2010 at para. 35; SH and Others v Austria Application No. 57813/00, 1 April 2010 at para. 38. 
63
 Vo v France 2004-VIII; 40 EHRR 12 at para. 37.  
64
 See the instruments cited supra n. 28. 
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more widely, just one of the UNESCO triumvirate has been referred to by the Court,
65
 
and we found no references at all to the UN Declaration on Human Cloning, or to the 
principles of benefit-sharing, the common heritage of mankind (bar a brief mention in 
a dissenting opinion)
66
 or the self-determination of peoples.
67
 Meanwhile, access to 
information drew mixed results: nothing under Article 10,
68
 but acknowledgement of the 
importance of securing such access in the environmental realm and, crucially, the crafting 
of a positive obligation to support this.
69
  
On the interaction between bioethics, medical ethics and law we found too little to 
allow for a characterisation of the Court’s view. The Universal Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR), which was adopted in 2005, has been referred 
to in just two cases, IG, MK and RH v Slovakia
70
 and Evans v United Kingdom.
71
 In each, 
the focus was on consent and it was Article 6 of the UDBHR, which deals with this issue, 
to which the Court made reference. The Court has used the term ‘bioethics’ on just three 
other occasions: in each instance the reference was to the work of the Council of Europe 
Steering Committee on Bioethics and its predecessor, the ad hoc committee of experts on 
                                                                
65
 The UDBHR 2005: see main text infra nn. 70-71.  
66
 Balmer-Schafroth and Others v Switzerland 1997-IV; 25 EHRR 598 (dissenting opinion of Judge Pettiti). 
67
 For discussion of negotiations towards an international legally-binding regime on access and benefit 
sharing, see Nijar, ‘Incorporating Traditional Knowledge in an International Regime on Access to Genetic 
Resources and Benefit Sharing: Problems and Prospects’ (2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 
460.  
68
 In Leander v Sweden A 116 (1987); 9 EHRR 433 at para. 74, the Court emphasised that Article 10’s 
freedom to receive information ‘basically prohibits a government from restricting a person from receiving 
information that others may wish or may be willing to impart to him’. If the guarantee is limited to 
receiving and imparting, then clearly it provides neither a right of access to information nor an obligation to 
provide it. 
69
 See main text infra n. 157. 
70
 Supra n. 62. 
71
 Supra n. 11 at para. 52.  
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progress in the biomedical sciences.
72
 Likewise, neither ‘ethics’ nor ‘medical ethics’ has 
featured in technology-centred cases examined by the Court,
73
 and we also had no 
relevant hits for ‘best interests’, a core ethical principle.74 This absence of ethics 
references was surprising, not least because the Court has been particularly clear on the 
requirement of informed consent: holding for example that, in the absence of consent, 
experimental medical treatment may breach Article 3, amounting to inhuman treatment 
and, potentially, torture.
75
  
Human dignity—specifically, the principle of respect for human dignity—was 
another keyword that produced fewer ‘new technology and human rights’ cases than 
expected. References to dignity recur in the UNESCO triumvirate (the UDHGHR 1997, 
IDHGD 2003 and UDBHR 2005), and in Pretty v United Kingdom, which concerned 
assisted suicide, a Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg Court affirmed that ‘the very 
essence of the [ECHR] is respect for human dignity and human freedom’.76  From a ‘new 
technologies’ angle however there is little in the Court’s case law: just one reference, and 
it is in a partly dissenting opinion—an opinion by Judge Marcus-Helmons in the case of 
                                                                
72
 SH and Others v Austria, supra n. 62 at para. 37; Vo v France, supra n. 63 at paras 38-40; Wilkinson v 
United Kingdom Application No. 14659/02, 28 February 2006.   
73
 ‘Professional ethics’ has featured in case law reviewing decisions made by professional disciplinary 
bodies: see, e.g., Frankowicz v Poland Application No. 53025/99, 16 December 2008; Stambuk v Germany 
37 EHRR 42; and Hertel v Switzerland 1998-VI; 28 EHRR 534.  
74
 But as noted by Harris et al., supra n. 43 at 407, the term ‘best interests of the child’ has been used in 
Article 8 case law as a way of capturing the legitimate aim pursued by an interference with parents’ ‘family 
life’. See, e.g., Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland Application No. 41615/07, 8 January 2009. 
75
 X v Denmark 32 DR 282 (1983). On the question of using a medical procedure, without a suspect’s 
consent, in order to obtain evidence of a crime and whether such evidence can be used at trial, see Jalloh v 
Germany 2006-IX; 44 EHRR 667. See relatedly Saunders v United Kingdom 1996-VI; 23 EHRR 313 at 
para. 69, where the Court said that Article 6 guarantee of freedom from self-incrimination does not extend 
to ‘the use in criminal proceedings of material which may be obtained from the accused through the use of 
compulsory powers but which has an existence independent of the will of the suspect such as, inter alia, 
…breath, blood and urine samples and bodily tissue for the purpose of DNA testing’. 
76
 2002-III; 35 EHRR 1 at para. 65. 
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Cyprus v Turkey.
77
 Noting that ‘the rapid evolution of biomedical techniques’ meant that 
‘new threats to human dignity may arise’, Judge Marcus-Helmons alluded to the Oviedo 
Convention as an instrument that ‘seeks to cover some of those dangers’. He went on to 
note two problems with this Convention: first, ‘only a limited number of States have 
signed it’ and, second, it only affords the European Court of Human Rights consultative 
jurisdiction. He therefore suggested that:  
 
[i]n order [for] this “fourth generation of human rights” to be taken into account 
so that human dignity is protected against possible abuse by scientific progress, 
the Court could issue a reminder that under Article 2 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights the States undertook to protect everyone’s right to life by law.78 
 
The precautionary principle was another keyword that proved disappointing. This 
principle emerged first in the environmental arena but lately it has migrated, including to 
both the public health field
79
 and the biotechnology one.
80
 We expected a cluster of 
technology-centered cases making reference it: we met with mixed results—of the six 
cases found, only three related in any way to technology
81
 while the remaining three dealt 
with child welfare or adoption.
82
 
                                                                
77
 2001-IV; 35 EHRR 30. 
78
 Ibid. (partly dissenting opinion  of Judge Marcus-Helmons). 
79
 See, e.g., Stokes, ‘The EC Courts’ Contribution to Refining the Parameters of Precaution’ (2008) 11 
Journal of Risk Research 4. 
80
 On the use of the principle in relation to red biotechnologies, see, e.g., Brownsword, ‘Happy Families, 
Consenting Couples, and Children with Dignity: Sex Selection and Saviour Siblings’ (2005) 17 Child and 
Family Quarterly 435; Somsen, ‘Cloning Trojan Horses: Precautionary Regulation of Reproductive 
Technologies’, in Brownsword and Yeung, supra n. 20 at 221.  
81
 Tătar and Tătar v Romania Application No. 67021/01, 5 July 2007 (and the subsequent French-language 
judgment, Tătar v Romania Application No. 67021/01, 27 January 2009); Asselbourg and Others v 
Luxembourg 1999-VI (inadmissible); Balmer-Schafroth, supra n. 66 (dissenting opinion of Judge Pettiti). In 
Tătar and Asselbourg, the Court refers not to the precautionary principle but the ‘principle of precaution’.  
Note also SH v Austria, supra n. 62 at paras 49-54 where the Court discusses how states should respond to 
the risks of new medical techniques in sensitive areas such as assisted conception.  
82
 Fretté v France 2002-I; 38 EHRR 438 (concurring opinion of Judge Costa); Neulinger and Shuruk, supra 
n. 74 (dissenting opinion of Judge Steiner); Dolhamre v Sweden Application No. 67/04, 8 June 2009 
(dissenting opinion of Judge Zupančič).  
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We do want to say a little about one of the adoption cases thrown up by the 
search, Fretté v France.
83
 This decision has attracted heavy criticism and, recently, in EB 
v France
84
 the Grand Chamber opted for a very different approach in a case with similar 
(though not identical) facts. In Fretté, the Court, in a 4-3 decision, held that the refusal to 
grant an authorisation to adopt to Philippe Fretté, a single gay man, did not violate his 
Convention rights. In reaching its decision, the majority accepted the argument of the 
French government to the effect that there was no consensus in the scientific community 
on the possible consequences of a child being adopted by one or more homosexual 
parents. That lack of consensus meant, they said, that in this area a broad margin of 
appreciation had to be left to states.
85
  
The precautionary principle gets an explicit mention in the case: Judge Costam, in 
a partly concurring opinion, suggests that ‘most of the majorities have based their 
decision, without saying so, on the precautionary principle’.86 For many, however, the 
majority’s approach towards scientific uncertainty was unacceptable; it was being used, 
they said, to undermine the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation. One commentator proposed that the Court ‘should be using the 
proportionality principle to temper the precautionary behavior of the government in the 
face of uncertain science’.87 Interestingly, in EB v France, which like Fretté concerned a 
refusal to authorise adoption by a gay person, the Grand Chamber took a different 
                                                                
83
 Ibid. 
84
 47 EHRR 509. 
85
 Fretté, supra n. 82 at para. 38. 
86
 Ibid.   
87
 Stone, ‘Margin of Appreciation Gone Awry’ (2003) 3 Connecticut Public International Law Journal 271 
at 223.  
Murphy and Ó Cuinn, ‘Works in Progress: New Technologies and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 10(4) Human 
Rights Law Review 601-38 
19 
approach, bypassing the issue of scientific uncertainty and finding a violation of Article 
14, taken in conjunction with Article 8.  
The majority’s approach in Fretté seems anomalous following EB v France— 
albeit that the Grand Chamber described the two cases as different ‘in a number of 
respects’.88 If Fretté is out of line, that would certainly be a welcome outcome as regards 
equality and non-discrimination: it would also fit with the European Convention on the 
Adoption of Children which acknowledges that states may wish to provide for adoption 
by same-sex couples.
89
 None of this, however, tells us how the precautionary principle is 
likely to play out in cases on new technologies. For assistance on that point, we need to 
turn to the three technology-related cases that mention the principle. The question is: do 
these take us towards an understanding of the Court’s approach to the precautionary 
principle?  
All three cases—Tătar and Tătar v Romania (and the subsequent French-
language judgment, Tătar v Romania),90 Asselbourg and Others v Luxembourg91 and 
Balmer-Schafroth and Others v Switzerland
92—examined the risks of pollution from 
either mining or nuclear power technologies. As we explain a little later, the Court sees 
both pollution and environmental hazards more generally as matters that fall within its 
remit. We explain, too, that it has imposed positive ‘environmental’ obligations on states 
under both Article 2 (right to life) and Article 8 (right to respect for private and family 
life, and home). These are, moreover, obligations of considerable substance—requiring 
states not just have laws and regulations designed to control severe environmental 
                                                                
88
 Supra n. 84 at para. 71. 
89
 ETS 58, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, (rev) 7 May 2008.  
90
 Supra n. 81. 
91
 Ibid. 
92
 Balmer-Schafroth, supra n. 66. 
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hazards (including from dangerous industrial or technological activities, whether public 
or private), but to pursue effective enforcement of those laws.
93
 States are also subject to 
obligations concerning participation and access (to justice and to information).
94
 
Together, this range of obligations conjures a Court that might be inclined towards the 
precautionary principle: the experience in practice, however, has not been so clear-cut—– 
not least because in cases involving environmental issues the Court accords a wide 
margin of appreciation to the state.
95
  
In Balmer-Schafroth the Grand Chamber considered the danger posed to the 
applicants by a nearby nuclear power plant, holding that the applicants had failed to 
establish a direct link between the operating of the power station and their right under 
Article 8 to protection of their physical integrity. The majority emphasised that an alleged 
personal danger should be ‘serious but also specific and, above all, imminent’96 before a 
violation could be considered. This stance came in for criticism in the dissenting opinion, 
led by Judge Pettiti and joined by seven colleagues:  
The majority appear to have ignored the whole trend of international institutions 
and public international law towards protecting persons and heritage, as evident in 
European Union and Council of Europe instruments on the environment, the Rio 
agreements, UNESCO instruments, the development of the precautionary 
principle and the principle of conservation of the common heritage.
97
  
 
                                                                
93
 See the cases cited infra n. 157. 
94
 See in particular Taşkın and Others v Turkey 2004-X; 42 EHRR 1127, discussed infra main text at n. 
162ff. 
95
 See Council of Europe Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), ‘Final Activity Report, Human 
Rights and the Environment’ (29 November 2005) CDDH (2005)016 Addendum II (rev) at 10, presenting 
this as one of the general principles characterising the Court’s case law in the environmental field. 
96
 Supra n. 66 at para. 40. 
97
 Ibid. 
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More recently, in Tătar,98 where the extraction processes of a gold-mining company used 
sodium cyanide, known for its toxicity, and operations were allowed to continue in the 
wake of an accident after which pollution, in excess of authorised norms, was detected 
near the applicants’ home, the Court made explicit use of the precautionary principle. It 
noted the ‘evolution of [this] philosophical principle to a legal standard’99 in European 
law and also how it had been formulated in the case law of the European Court of Justice. 
It also noted, inter alia, both the Aarhus Convention and the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development.
100
 Turning to the facts of the case, it observed that the 
presence of a serious and material risk to human health and well-being imposed an 
obligation on the state to assess risks, at the permit stage and after the accident, and to 
take appropriate measures. The Court noted that a preliminary impact assessment had 
indicated that there were risks involved in the mining process but that the authorities had 
failed to lay down operating conditions that would preclude the risk of serious harm. 
Moreover, even after the accident took place, the authorities did not intervene to stop the 
process. This was, the Court said, in breach of the precautionary principle. Finding a 
violation of Article 8, the Court concluded that the authorities failed in their obligation to 
assess, to a satisfactory degree, the potential risks of the mining activities, and to take 
appropriate measures so as to protect the rights of those concerned to respect for their 
private lives and homes.
101
  
                                                                
98
 Supra n. 81.  
99
 Ibid. at para. 69: ‘l’évolution du principe d’une conception philosophique vers une norme juridique’ (our 
translation). 
100
 Ibid. at para. 120. 
101
 Ibid. at para. 125. Cf. Asselbourg, supra n. 81 where the Court said that it was not evident ‘that the 
conditions of operation imposed by the Luxembourg authorities and in particular the norms dealing with 
the discharge of air-polluting wastes were so inadequate as to constitute a serious violation of the principle 
of precaution’. 
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To close this section of the article we want briefly to look at intellectual property 
rights. New technologies are often attached to legal rights such as patents, and are closely 
linked to trademarks and copyright: as a result, we anticipated cases dealing with the 
state’s duty to protect an individual’s interests through legislation, preventive measures or 
provision of a remedy. Coming up with a keyword to capture intellectual property rights 
was not easy, however. Initially we used ‘protection of the moral and material 
interests resulting from one’s scientific productions’ and, when this failed to give us 
any cases, we opted for a further search using terms that feature in General Comment 17 
of the Committee on ESCR.
102
 Again, there were no hits—apart from ‘intellectual 
property’.103 The latter term did, however, reveal that the Convention institutions have 
been called upon to rule on questions of intellectual property only very rarely. It also 
revealed a couple of points of substance. First, rights such as trade marks,
104
 
copyrights,
105
 patents,
106
 and the use of an internet domain name
107
 have been considered 
by the Court and Commission to constitute ‘possessions’ for the purposes of Article 1 of 
the First Protocol to the Convention.
108
 Second, as regards the relationship between the 
Convention and the European Patent Convention (and the EPO, which administers the 
latter instrument), in the Heinz case the Commission indicated that ‘the transfer of powers 
                                                                
102
 CESCR, General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral 
and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She Is 
the Author (Art 15(1)), 21 November 2005, E/C.12/GC/17. 
103
 So, for example, there were no hits for ‘material safeguard for the freedom of scientific research’ or 
‘preventing misappropriation of another’s investment’. 
104
 Anheuser-Busch Inc v Portugal 45 EHRR 830 at paras 72, 78, agreeing with the Commission in Smith 
Kline and French Laboratories Ltd v The Netherlands (1990) DR 66. 
105
 Melnychuk v Ukraine Application No. 28743/03, 5 July 2005. 
106
 Smith Kline, supra n. 104. 
107
 Paeffgen GmBH v Germany Application Nos. 25379/04, 21688/05, 21722/05 and 21770/05, 
18 September 2007. 
108
 In Anheuser-Busch Inc, supra n. 104 at para. 72, the Grand Chamber held that that Article 1 of Protocol 
1 ‘is applicable to intellectual property as such’. 
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to an international organisation is not incompatible with the [ECHR] provided that within 
that organisation fundamental rights will receive an equivalent protection’.109 This 
presumption of equivalence has been confirmed by the Grand Chamber,
110
 and 
subsequently held sway in Rambus Inc v Germany, a case which dealt with a private 
company’s European patent in the area of chip technology. It was however noted that the 
presumption:   
could be rebutted, if in the circumstances of a particular case, it was considered 
that the protection of Convention rights was manifestly deficient… [I]n such a 
case, the interest of international cooperation would be outweighed by the 
Convention’s role as a “constitutional instrument of European public order in the 
field of human rights”.111  
 
 
5. What We Found 
 
A great deal of what we did find emerged from the case law on one Article: Article 8, 
which provides a qualified or non-absolute right to respect for private and family life, 
home and correspondence. Our findings are reported below. First, however, we look at 
how the Court has described ‘new technologies’, and the advice it has given to 
contracting parties vis-à-vis its concerns about such technologies.   
   
A. What, According To The Court, Is A New Technology? And What Are The Court’s 
Concerns About Such Technologies?  
 
                                                                
109
 Heinz v the Contracting Parties also parties to the European Patent Convention (1994) DR 76-A 125 
(emphasis added). 
110
 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland 2005-VI; 42 EHRR 1 at para. 155.  
111
 Rambus Inc v Germany Application No. 40382/04, 16 June 2009. 
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The Court has not defined ‘new technologies’. Moreover, it rarely uses the word ‘new’ in 
conjunction with either an individual technology or technologies more generally: it 
speaks instead of technologies undergoing ‘rapid development’,112 of ‘the technology 
available for use … continually becoming more sophisticated’.113  
In Saunders v United Kingdom, ‘our modern societies’ were described, in a 
dissenting opinion, as ‘information societies’.114 The opinion goes on to note that ‘all of 
us, government agencies as well as citizens, to a large extent depend on various kinds of 
information’ and that it is therefore ‘[n]o wonder that fraud in multiple forms is the bane 
of our societies’: such frauds are, it said, ‘all the more tempting since our computerised 
world with its manifold cryptographic devices makes it much easier to effectively hide 
them’.115 The Court returned to the theme of crime and ‘our computerised world’ in KU v 
Finland, where it noted that ‘[t]he rapid development of telecommunications 
technologies (in particular the Internet) in recent decades has led to the emergence of new 
types of crime and has also enabled the commission of traditional crimes by means of 
new technologies’.116  
In its judgment in S and Marper, the Court accepted that ‘the fight against crime’ 
–especially against organised crime and terrorism—‘depends to a great extent on the use 
                                                                
112
 KU v Finland Application No. 2872/02, 2 December 2008 at para. 22. 
113
Kruslin v France A 176 (1990); 12 EHRR 547 at para. 33. See also Kopp v Switzerland 1998-II; 27 
EHRR 91 at para. 72. 
114
 Supra n. 75 (dissenting opinion of Judge Martens joined by Judge Kuris).  
115
 Ibid. See relatedly Timurtas v Turkey 2000-VI; 33 EHRR 121 at para. 66, wherein the Court accepted 
that a ‘photocopied document should be subjected to close scrutiny before it can be accepted as a true copy 
of an original, the more so as it is undeniably true that modern technological devices can be employed to 
forge, or to tamper with, documents’. 
116
 Supra n. 112 at para. 22. In Times Newspapers Ltd v United Kingdom Application Nos 3002/03 and 
23676/03, 10 March 2009, at para. 27, the Court recognised that the ‘Internet plays an important role in 
enhancing the public’s access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information generally’. 
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of modern scientific techniques of investigation and identification’,117 in particular 
techniques of DNA analysis. This, it said, was ‘beyond dispute’.118 Earlier in Peck v 
United Kingdom, the Court had acknowledged the usefulness of CCTV in tackling 
crime,
119
 and it has also accepted that the use of secret measures of surveillance—to 
intercept mail, telephone and email communications—may be necessary in a democratic 
society.
120
 But in a departure from its standard practice, and in recognition of ‘the 
particular features of secret surveillance measures and the importance of ensuring 
effective control and supervision of them’,121 the Court has been willing to allow general 
challenges to legislative regimes and practices governing this area.
122
 The Court’s 
position is that the mere existence of legislation which allows secret monitoring of 
communications creates a surveillance threat for all those to whom the legislation might 
be applied. The Court has also been rigorous in its application of the ‘in accordance with 
the law’ requirement in this field.123 
Our search suggests that references to the pace of change have occurred most 
often in the case law on Article 8. In S and Marper, for example, the Court noted the 
‘rapid pace of developments in the field of genetics and information technology’ and said 
that it could not ‘discount the possibility that in the future the private-life interests bound 
up with genetic information may be adversely affected in novel ways or in a manner 
                                                                
117
 Supra n. 3 at para. 105. The Court also noted that states have made ‘rapid and marked progress’ in using 
DNA information to facilitate determinations of innocence or guilt. 
118
 Ibid. 
119
 Supra n. 4 at para. 79. 
120
 See, e.g., Klass and Others v Germany A 28 (1978); 2 EHRR 214 at para. 48.   
121
 Kennedy v United Kingdom, supra n. 6 at para. 118. 
122
 The approach was set out in Klass, supra n. 120 at paras. 34-38 and 41. For examples of its application, 
see Weber and Saravia v Germany 2006-XI; 46 EHRR SE5; and Liberty and Others v United Kingdom, 
supra n. 6.  
123
 Infra main text at nn. 208-210. 
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which cannot be anticipated with precision today’.124 It also issued a warning to 
technology-hungry states, emphasising that the take-up of new technologies in the 
criminal justice sphere must not lead to Article 8 becoming ‘unacceptably weakened’.125 
Earlier in Kruslin v France,
126
 the Court had taken a look at tapping and other modes of 
intercepting telephone conversations, describing such interceptions as a serious 
interference with private life and correspondence, and calling for ‘clear, detailed rules on 
the subject, especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming more 
sophisticated’.127 Furthermore, as far back as 1984, Judge Pettiti in a concurring opinion 
in Malone v United Kingdom noted that the Convention ‘protects the community of men’ 
and that ‘man in our times has a need to preserve his identity, to refuse the total 
transparency of society, to maintain the privacy of his personality’.128 Invoking the 
Court’s role as ‘guardian of the Convention’, he emphasised that one of the ways in 
which the Court fulfils this role is ‘by investing Article 8 with its full dimension and by 
limiting the margin of appreciation especially in those areas where the individual is more 
and more vulnerable as a result of modern technology’.129 He spoke of the role of others 
too, describing the ‘mission’ of the Council of Europe and its organs as being ‘to prevent 
the establishment of systems and methods that would allow “Big Brother” to become 
master of the citizen’s private life’.130 
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The right to freedom of expression, protected by Article 10, is one of the things 
that keeps ‘Big Brother’ at bay, and as the Convention institutions have emphasised this 
freedom has other benefits as well. For example, in HUH v Switzerland the Commission 
described freedom of opinion as a necessity in a democratic society ‘in that it can make 
the authorities and science discover problems of public health’.131 Later in Hertel v 
Switzerland, in describing health dangers posed by microwave ovens as ‘a sphere in 
which it is unlikely that any certainty exists’, the Court emphasised that ‘it would be 
particularly unreasonable to restrict freedom of expression only to generally accepted 
ideas’.132 The general point arising from Hertel is that where commercial expression 
relates to a matter of public interest, the Court adopts a more stringent level of review 
than is the norm in commercial expression cases—put differently, the state’s margin of 
appreciation is not so wide when commercial expression relates to a matter of public 
interest.
133
     
We shall be returning to the margin of appreciation in our discussion of Article 8 
case law. Here however it is worth noting that the Court’s use of this doctrine tends to 
make identification of general trends both difficult and dangerous. Our terrain—cases 
concerning new technologies—is distinctly treacherous. We have already mentioned that 
in cases on environmental issues the Court grants a wide margin of appreciation to the 
state. And shortly we shall see that another standard trigger is the absence of consensus 
within the member states of the Council of Europe, ‘either as to the relative importance of 
                                                                
131
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132
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the interest at stake or as to the best means of protecting it, particularly where the case 
raises sensitive moral or ethical issues’.134  
Still, we need to hazard some pointers. In so doing we shall focus on signals for 
domestic authorities, starting with Tavli v Turkey
135
 where there was advice for domestic 
courts facing the challenges of ‘our modern societies’. Tavli concerned an applicant who 
wanted to use newly-available DNA evidence in order to disclaim paternity but was 
refused a rehearing on the ground that ‘scientific progress’ was not a condition for retrial 
under the state’s code of civil procedure. In finding a violation of Article 8,136 the Court 
advised the domestic courts that they should be interpreting the existing legislation ‘in 
light of scientific progress and the social repercussions that follow’.137  
The case of KU v Finland
138
 suggests that awareness of scientific progress and its 
social repercussions is also a prerequisite for legislators. This case arose as a result of an 
advert of a sexual nature about the applicant on an Internet dating site. At the time of the 
posting, the applicant was only 12 years old. The advert gave his age, year of birth and a 
description of his physical characteristics, as well as a link to his web page where his 
picture could be found, and it said that he was looking for an intimate relationship with 
another boy, of his own age or older ‘to show him the way’. The applicant became aware 
of the posting when he received an email from a man, offering to meet him. Under the 
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136
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opportunity to deny paternity of a child who, according to scientific evidence, was not his own, [that child] 
has also an interest in knowing the identity of her biological father’. 
137
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law in Finland, at the time, the Internet provider could not be required to provide details 
of the identity of the person who had posted the advert.  
The Court, in a unanimous judgment, held that the applicant’s Article 8 right to 
respect for private life had been violated. It did note the difficulties of policing ‘modern 
societies’ and, linked to this, it acknowledged that the state’s positive obligation under 
Article 8 to criminalise offences against the person, and to reinforce such criminalisation 
via effective investigation and prosecution, must not generate an impossible or 
disproportionate burden on legislators. It also noted the government’s argument that any 
legislative failing needed to be seen ‘in its social context at the time’.139 But it went on to 
emphasise that, by 1999, when the incident took place:  
it was well-known that the Internet, precisely because of its anonymous character, 
could be used for criminal purposes. … Also the widespread problem of child 
sexual abuse had become well-known over the preceding decade. Therefore, it 
cannot be said that the respondent Government did not have the opportunity to put 
in place a system to protect child victims from being exposed as targets for 
paedophiliac approaches via the Internet.
140
    
 
The Court made two points of interest with respect to freedom of expression, 
confidentiality and privacy. It noted, first, that although respect for the freedom of 
expression and privacy of service-users must be guaranteed, any such guarantees could 
not be absolute: they might have to give way in order, for example, to protect the rights 
and freedoms of others, or to prevent crime. An overriding requirement of confidentiality 
of Internet services was unacceptable and it was ‘the task of the legislator to provide a 
framework for reconciling the various claims which compete for protection in this 
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context’.141 Second, recalling the facts of the case—the posting of an advertisement of a 
sexual nature about a 12 year old boy on an Internet dating site—the Court left open the 
question whether such conduct, given its ‘reprehensible nature’, could in any event attract 
protection under Articles 8 and 10.
142
 
Legislators will also want to note that in another area of new technologies— 
medically assisted procreation—the Court has made it clear that contracting states have 
no obligation under the Convention to permit such technologies.
143
 Should they choose to 
do so however, they will need to be alert to the prohibition on discrimination enshrined 
in Article 14. This comes through clearly in SH and Others v Austria
144
 wherein the state 
had barred certain forms of IVF but not others and was unable to justify the difference in 
treatment. The problem of discrimination surfaced in a different context in S and Marper 
v United Kingdom,
145
 which concerned a national DNA database—specifically, the 
indefinite retention, without consent, of the fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA 
profiles of persons who had been acquitted, or whose cases had been dropped. The Court 
did not consider the complaint under Article 14 but, in its discussion of Article 8(2), it 
made two points that are relevant here. First, it expressed concern about the risk of 
stigmatisation, ‘stemming from the fact that persons in the position of the applicants, who 
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have not been convicted of any offence and are entitled to the presumption of innocence, 
are treated in the same way as convicted persons’.146 Second, it endorsed the view of the 
UK-based Nuffield Council on Bioethics noting that, as applied, the retention policy had 
led to the over-representation in the database of ‘young persons and ethnic minorities, 
who have not been convicted of any crime’.147  
To round out this discussion of non-discrimination we need to revert to ARTs; 
specifically, the sad case of Evans v United Kingdom.
148
 Here six frozen embryos 
represented the applicant’s only chance of becoming a genetic parent. These embryos had 
been created, using the applicant’s eggs and the sperm of her then-fiancé, before she 
underwent cancer treatment which destroyed her fertility. Her (by now) ex-fiancé 
triggered the case when he refused consent to the use or continued storage of the 
embryos:
149
 under the domestic law on ARTs, which placed consent at centre-stage, this 
meant that the embryos had to be destroyed. Evans challenged that law, complaining 
inter alia of discrimination contrary to Article 14 taken in conjunction with the rights to 
respect for private and family life under Article 8. She argued that the consent rules 
prevented her from ever becoming a parent ‘in the genetic sense’. Moreover, they were 
discriminatory because they subjected her, an infertile woman, to a ‘male veto’, whereas 
a woman who could conceive without assistance could make reproductive decisions 
without reference to the genetic father.  
Four courts considered Evans’ case—the High Court and Court of Appeal in 
England, and a Chamber and Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg Court—and all four 
                                                                
146
 Ibid. at para. 42. 
147
 Ibid. at para. 44. 
148
 Supra n. 11. 
149
 There was dispute as to whether the ex-fiancé’s action was to be characterised as a refusal of consent, or 
a withdrawal of it. The distinction had no impact on the Convention issues.   
Murphy and Ó Cuinn, ‘Works in Progress: New Technologies and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 10(4) Human 
Rights Law Review 601-38 
32 
decided against her.
150
 Although the Article 14 point was not discussed at Strasbourg,
151
 
the facts of the case are enough for us to be able to frame the overarching question: 
namely, is gender neutrality—that is, equal treatment of women and men—the 
appropriate way to regulate ARTs?
152
 Evans demonstrates just how difficult a question 
that is. Relatedly, we might ask: what place should be accorded to bright-line rules 
concerning consent in any ART regulatory regime? In short, is it either necessary or 
proportionate to ‘permit of no exceptions in the provision of a veto on the use of embryos 
to either gamete provider’?153    
The Evans case comes up again later in our discussion of Article 8. Here though 
we need to mention another aspect of the case that will be of interest to national 
lawmakers: namely, when Article 2(1) says that ‘[e]veryone’s right to life shall be 
protected by law’, does ‘everyone’ encompass the human embryo? In Evans both the 
Chamber and Grand Chamber held that Article 2 was not violated by a rule that required 
the destruction of frozen embryos once consent to their use or continued storage had been 
withdrawn by one of the gamete donors.
154
 This decision was not a surprise, however, 
given that in Vo v France the Grand Chamber had held that, ‘in the absence of any 
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European consensus on the scientific and legal definition of the beginning of life, the 
issue of when the right to life begins comes within the margin of appreciation which the 
Court generally considers that States should enjoy in this sphere’.155  
We turn finally to the most startling advice—startling both because it stems from 
the Court’s ‘greening of human rights law’,156 a move that could not have been 
guaranteed, and because the advice itself is so robust. Articles 2 and 8 are our starting-
point here.
157
 It is from these that the Court has constructed a range of positive 
‘environmental’ obligations: thus, states must regulate and control hazardous activities 
(whether public or private
158
) where these are impairing Convention rights or might 
impair them, and they must enforce such regulations; states must also provide access to 
information on serious environmental risks (indeed, in some instances, they may have a 
duty to inform affected parties
159
); and they must secure both public participation in 
environmental decision-making and access to justice in environmental cases.  
Together, these obligations amount to ‘undeniable progress’ towards the ‘opening 
up of an environmental horizon of human rights’.160 More prosaically, they mean that our 
search had high-quality hits with a number of keywords: notably, public participation in 
decision-making, and linked to this access to information and access to justice—terms 
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that reflect the title of the Aarhus Convention.
161
 The most interesting hit was Taşkın 
and Others v Turkey, a case under Article 8. Here an administrative authority had failed 
to comply with a judicial decision which had revoked the permit for a gold-mining 
operation because of its adverse effects on the environment. A secret decision by the 
authority, in violation of the court order, allowed production to continue at the mine.
162
 
The Strasbourg Court, finding a violation of Article 8, made two key points. First, there 
has to effective enforcement of measures designed to protect rights; simply having the 
measures in place is not enough.
163
 Second, states have a range of procedural duties; 
specifically, the Court held that:  
 whilst Article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirement, the decision-making 
process leading to measures of interference must be fair and such as to afford due 
respect to the interests of the individual as safeguarded by Article 8.
164
  
 
This seems to be another way of saying that, to comply with Article 8, affected 
individuals must be able to participate in the decision-making process. The Court also 
spells out steps that should be taken by states where ‘complex issues of environmental 
and economic policy’ have to be determined: ‘the decision-making process must firstly 
involve appropriate investigations and studies in order to allow them to predict and 
evaluate in advance the effects of those activities which might damage the environment 
and infringe individuals’ rights and to enable them to strike a fair balance between the 
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various conflicting interests at stake’.165 And the Court did not stop there: it deepened its 
‘greening of human rights law’ with two further requirements: first, information 
concerning environmental risks must be available to those who are likely to be affected, 
and second such individuals ‘must also be able to appeal to the courts, against any 
decision, act or omission where they consider that their interests or their comments have 
not been given sufficient weight in the decision-making process’.166 How to sum up? 
Well, put shortly, with just one case—Taşkın—the Court has shown its own capacity for 
innovation and assigned a considerable amount of ongoing human rights work to the 
contracting states. 
 
B. Article 8 of the Convention 
 
We turn finally to Article 8 which recurred again and again in our search, providing more 
direct hits than any other Article in the Convention. That did not surprise us: for starters, 
Article 8 encompasses a wide range of interests—namely, ‘private and family life, home 
and correspondence’. Secondly, the Court has favoured an expansive approach to those 
interests, not least when faced with evidence of technological change and the social 
repercussions that follow. Thirdly, this expansiveness has been reinforced by the Court’s 
insistence that this Article, which speaks of ‘the right to respect’ for private and family 
life, home and correspondence, places not just negative obligations on the contracting 
states but positive ones too.
167
 This in turn has meant that the Court has had to engage 
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with the question of when the state, as part of those positive obligations, may need to 
limit other Convention rights in order to secure an Article 8 one. So, for example, in Von 
Hannover v Germany concerning the publication of photographs of a well-known public 
figure, the Court held that the state is under a positive obligation to protect individuals 
from invasion of their privacy by other individuals, and that this may necessitate 
measures limiting press freedom under Article 10.
168
 Fourth and finally the volume of 
cases on Article 8 has allowed the Court considerable scope to refine its approach 
towards the margin of appreciation and the fair balance principle, both of which arise not 
just in connection with the requirement under Article 8(2) that to be justified an 
interference must be, inter alia, ‘necessary in a democratic society’ but also in connection 
with the state’s positive obligations under Article 8(1).  
 
 
(i) Private and family life, home and correspondence 
 
We begin by looking in turn at the four interests protected by Article 8(1)—namely, 
‘private and family life, home and correspondence’.  
 
Private life 
 
As to ‘private life’, in Peck v United Kingdom, a case concerning disclosure of CCTV 
footage to the media (which resulted in images of the applicant being published and 
broadcast widely), the Court advised that the term is a broad one, ‘not susceptible to 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
obligations to criminalize private surveillance or data collection which impinged upon an individual’s 
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exhaustive definition’.169 Fortunately, the Court has provided some pointers:170 here we 
concentrate on those activities and interests under ‘private life’ that have an obvious new 
technologies angle.
171
 There are a number of these, including the decisions to have and 
not to have a child, which in turn include both the decision to become a parent ‘in the 
genetic sense’172 and the decision to use medically-assisted procreation (where the state 
has chosen to legislate to allow such technologies).
173
 Such decisions fall under ‘private 
life’ because they are central to the ‘physical and psychological integrity of the 
person’.174 ‘Integrity’ has other technology-relevant aspects too: so, for example, 
environmental hazards—such as pollution—are covered by ‘private life’ because they 
can affect the physical well-being of the person.
175
 The Court has also made it clear that 
consent is a pre-requisite if medical treatment is not to amount to a violation of the 
integrity of the person.
176
   
Private life is not, however, restricted to integrity. It also encompasses each of the 
following: identity; a ‘zone’ or space of privacy; and the collection, storage or use of 
personal information, including bio-information.
177
 In what follows we look briefly at 
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each aspect in turn, starting with identity. The Court has said that ‘private life’ embraces 
‘multiple aspects of the person’s physical and social identity’.178 To pin down some of 
these, we can look to the majority judgment in SH and Others v Austria,
179
 which 
provides a useful summary. It begins by reiterating the principle that respect for private 
life ‘requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as 
individual human beings’.180 Such information has, it says, ‘formative implications’181 for 
an individual’s personality. It goes on to note that, although not an absolute entitlement, 
obtaining information necessary to ‘discover the truth concerning important aspects of 
one’s personal identity, such as the identity of one’s parents’,182 falls within respect for 
private life. So, for example, in Odièvre v France, where the applicant challenged the 
practice of ‘anonymous birth’ and called for the state to disclose information concerning 
her genetic parents, the Grand Chamber accepted that her claim to know her personal 
history fell within Article 8(1),
183
 noting that ‘birth, and in particular the circumstances in 
which a child is born, forms part of a child’s, and subsequently the adult’s, private life 
guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention’.184  
  The next dimension of private life—the ‘zone’ or space of privacy—can be dealt 
with pretty briefly. From a new technologies’ perspective, there are just two points of 
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note: first, as demonstrated by Von Hannover v Germany,
185
 where publication of 
photographs of the applicant, a well-known figure, going about her daily life fell within 
‘private life’, even public figures are entitled to a zone of privacy. Moreover, in order to 
protect the zone of privacy, states may have to adopt measures to protect a person’s 
picture against abuse by others; states need, in other words, to do more than abstain from 
interfering in the zone of privacy.
186
 Second, although complaints about environmental 
hazards, on the one hand, and secret surveillance on the other, proceed more often under 
other elements of Article 8, they have also succeeded under the ‘zone of privacy’ 
interest.
187
   
The final dimension of private life we want to look at concerns the collection, 
storage or use of personal information. This has come before the Court quite a bit; 
moreover, the Court’s approach towards data protection has generally been very robust. 
Information about an individual’s health, and ethnic identity, have been described as 
‘important’ elements of private life,188 and the Court has endorsed the view that ‘there 
can be little if anything, more private to the individual than the knowledge of his genetic 
makeup’.189 Additionally, even if the collection of personal data can be justified, this does 
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not guarantee that its use or retention will also be acceptable to the Court.
190
 Indeed the 
mere storage of data concerning an individual’s private life may amount to an 
interference within the meaning of Article 8;
191
  the Court has taken the view that ‘the 
subsequent use of the stored information has no bearing on that finding’.192 And, as noted 
in Rotaru v Romania, refusing to allow an opportunity for information relating to an 
individual’s private life to be refuted may also amount to an interference under Article 
8.
193
 
To gain a better understanding of the Court’s position we can look at S and 
Marper,
194
 where the applicants complained that the indefinite retention of their 
fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles on a national database constituted an 
unjustified interference with their right to respect for private life under Article 8. Neither 
applicant had been convicted of a crime (S, a minor, had been acquitted, and the charges 
against Marper had been dropped), and neither had consented to the indefinite retention 
of the data. In assessing whether the retention interfered with the applicants’ rights, the 
Court—in line with its previous practice195—opted for separate consideration of 
fingerprints on the one hand, and the samples and profiles on the other. It did this 
because, as it said, ‘[i]t is common ground that fingerprints do not contain as much 
information as either cellular samples or DNA profiles’.196 As between the samples and 
the profiles, the Court noted that retention of the former raised more serious concerns. 
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There were, the Court said, ‘legitimate concerns about the conceivable use of cellular 
material in the future’; additionally, such samples were of a ‘highly personal nature’ and 
contained ‘much sensitive information about an individual, including information about 
his or her health’. Concurring with a view expressed by Baroness Hale in the UK House 
of Lords, the Court also emphasised that cellular samples contain ‘a unique genetic code 
of great relevance to both the individual and his relatives’.197 As a result, their retention 
per se was to be regarded as an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their 
private lives.  
Retention of their fingerprints, and DNA profiles, also constituted interferences 
under Article 8. As regards the latter, the Court rejected the state’s arguments that such 
profiles are ‘nothing more than a sequence of numbers … containing information of a 
purely objective and irrefutable character and … the identification of a subject only 
occurs in case of a match with another profile in the database’. It also rejected the 
argument that, because computer technology and expertise were needed to make the 
information intelligible, access to it would be limited. The Court took the view that the 
profiles’ capacity ‘to provide a means of identifying genetic relationships between 
individuals’ was enough for their retention per se to be regarded as an interference with 
the right to private life of the individuals concerned. It went on to note that because such 
profiles allow states to make inferences as to ethnic origin, which are then used in police 
investigations, their retention is ‘all the more sensitive and susceptible of affecting the 
right to private life’.198 
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In assessing whether retention of the applicants’ fingerprints constituted an 
interference under Article 8, the Court engaged in a review of its own case law. The UK 
government had sought to convince the Court that because fingerprints were neutral, 
objective and irrefutable, retaining them did not interfere with the applicants’ rights. The 
Court agreed that fingerprints were both objective and irrefutable, but given that they 
contain ‘unique information about the individual concerned allowing his or identification 
with precision in a wide range of circumstances’, their retention without consent on a 
database was not to be regarded as either neutral or insignificant. It concluded that 
‘retention of fingerprints on the authorities’ records in connection with an identified or 
identifiable individual may in itself give rise … to important private-life concerns’,199 
although it did accept that, as regards the question of justification, it might be necessary 
to distinguish between the collection, storage and use of fingerprints, on the one hand, 
and cellular samples and DNA profiles on the other. 
  
Family life 
 
We turn now from ‘private life’ to ‘family life’, the second interest protected by Article 
8(1). Looking at this interest from a new technologies’ angle, there is little to say bar the 
following. First, in those cases where the applicants, who were married couples, 
complained of an interference with Article 8 because of a specific prohibition on, or 
refusal of, access to assisted reproductive technologies (in circumstances where the state 
has made provision for the use of such technologies), the Court has made it clear that it is 
not just private life, but also family life, that incorporates the right to respect for the 
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decision to become a genetic parent. So, for example, in Dickson v United Kingdom, 
which concerned the refusal of facilities for artificial insemination to the applicants, a 
prisoner and his wife, the Court found that Article 8 was in play because the refusal of 
these facilities concerned the applicants’ private and family lives, both of which 
incorporate the right to respect for the decision to become a genetic parent.
200
 It is 
important to note a second point, however: Article 8 does not safeguard ‘the mere desire 
to found a family’.201 The third and final point to be noted is that a biological link may 
not be enough to allow an applicant to claim a ‘family life’ interest: the Court looks for 
‘close personal ties’, ties that demonstrate ‘an emotional relationship between two beings 
and a desire to pursue that relationship’,202 and in M v The Netherlands, the Commission 
expressed the view that where a man had donated sperm only to enable a woman to 
become pregnant through artificial insemination, that alone did not give him a right to 
respect for family life with the child.
203
 
 
Home and correspondence 
 
The final two interests protected by Article 8(1) are ‘home’ and ‘correspondence’. Our 
search threw up nothing with respect to ‘home’, bar two general points which could be 
pertinent in a new technologies’ context: first, when a business or profession is conducted 
from a person’s private residence that is covered by ‘home’;204 and second, noise, 
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emissions, smells or other similar forms of interference may amount to a breach of the 
right to respect for home if they prevent enjoyment of the amenities of home.
205
  
‘Correspondence’ proved more fruitful: here our keywords secured a new-
technologies’ hit as a result of Copland v United Kingdom,206 one of the cluster of cases 
that first drew us towards this project. In Copland, the applicant’s telephone, email and 
internet usage had been monitored during her employment at a local college, a statutory 
body administered by the state. The applicant was never advised that such monitoring 
might take place; she therefore had a reasonable expectation as to the privacy of both her 
phone calls and her email and internet usage. The Court unanimously found a violation of 
Article 8, noting that the collection and storage of personal information relating to the 
applicant through her use of the telephone, email and internet interfered with the right to 
respect for both correspondence and private life. The Court did accept that, on occasion, 
it might be legitimate for an employer to monitor and regulate employees’ use of such 
devices, but provided no elaboration on the point.  
 
(ii) Positive and negative obligations: the margin of appreciation and the fair balance 
principle  
 
Of course, the finding that one or more of ‘private and family life, home and 
correspondence’ is in play does not mean that there has been a violation of the 
Convention. There are two reasons for this. There is, first, the question whether there is a 
positive obligation inherent in ‘respect’ for the relevant interest, requiring the state to 
                                                                
205
 See, e.g., Hatton v United Kingdom 2003-VIII; 37 EHRR 611 at para. 96.   
206
 Supra n. 5. Note also Niemietz v Germany A 251-B (1992); 16 EHRR 97, wherein a computer hard-disk 
was held to constitute ‘correspondence’. 
Murphy and Ó Cuinn, ‘Works in Progress: New Technologies and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 10(4) Human 
Rights Law Review 601-38 
45 
take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the rights protected by Article 8(1). 
And second—as made clear by Article 8(2)—a state may be able to justify an 
interference with Article 8(1) by showing that it is ‘in accordance with law’, in pursuit of 
a legitimate aim and ‘necessary in a democratic society’. It is to these aspects of Article 8 
that we now turn, focusing exclusively on decisions and dicta that draw out the new 
technologies’ angle. Most of what we found concerns the question of proportionality—
specifically, the fair balance principle and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation.
207
 
We begin however with some brief comments on the Article 8(2) requirement that any 
interference must be ‘in accordance with the law’ and also in pursuit of a legitimate aim.  
 
In accordance with the law and in pursuit of a legitimate aim  
 
We look first at the former requirement, where almost all of the case law we encountered 
concerned telephone tapping, secret surveillance and covert intelligence-gathering, and 
the Court’s focus was the quality of the law in place, rather than the absence of law per 
se. We found relevant material in S and Marper too, the case concerning the DNA 
database. Noting that the approach applied in the surveillance context was ‘as essential … 
in this context’,208 the Court went on to provide a summary of what it described as its 
‘well-established case-law’209 on ‘in accordance with law’. It indicated, first, that the 
requirement will only be met where three conditions are satisfied – the impugned 
measure must have some basis in domestic law; it must be compatible with the rule of 
law; and it must be adequately accessible and foreseeable. Second, to meet these 
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requirements, there must be both ‘clear, detailed rules governing the scope and 
application of measures’ and ‘minimum safeguards’ concerning, inter alia, ‘duration, 
storage, usage, access of third parties, procedures for preserving the integrity and 
confidentiality of data and procedures for its destruction’. The intention, in short, is that 
there should be ‘sufficient guarantees against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness’.210   
Staying with S and Marper, we can also get a sense of the second requirement: 
namely, that any interference must be in pursuit of a legitimate aim. What counts as such 
an aim is identified in Article 8(2) where the list includes public safety, the economic 
well-being of the country and the protection of health or morals. Here we offer three 
illustrations of this requirement. The first is from S and Marper, wherein the Court 
accepted that the retention of fingerprints and DNA information ‘pursues the legitimate 
purpose of the detection, and therefore, prevention of crime’.211 The second is listed in  
the Council of Europe’s Manual on Human Rights and the Environment: it states that one 
of the general principles applied in environmental cases under the ECHR is that 
‘protection of the environment may be legitimate aim justifying interference with certain 
individual human rights’,212 including the right to property. The final example is Kennedy 
v United Kingdom, one of our original cluster of cases, wherein the Court reiterated that 
powers to instruct secret surveillance of citizens are only permitted under Article 8 ‘to the 
extent that they are strictly necessary for safeguarding democratic institutions’.213  
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The fair balance principle and the margin of appreciation  
 
We have already noted that states have both positive and negative obligations under 
Article 8. The Court’s position is that ‘the boundaries between [these obligations] do not 
lend themselves to precise definition’.214 It has however indicated that ‘[t]he applicable 
principles are nonetheless similar. In particular, in both instances regard must be had to 
the fair balance which has to be struck between the competing interests; and in both 
contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation’.215 For us, the question that 
arises is: what if anything in the Court’s case law on fair balance and the margin of 
appreciation is pertinent to new technologies?   
 As regards the breadth of the margin of appreciation, Evans v United Kingdom,
216
 
which was handled as a case concerning the state’s positive obligation, provides a useful 
summary of three key factors that may affect this matter. The first is that ‘where a 
particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake, the margin 
allowed to the State will be restricted’.217 In SH and Others, ‘the wish for a child’ was 
named as ‘one such particularly important facet’,218 and from Evans itself it is clear that 
becoming a genetic parent (which was what Natallie Evans wanted), and not becoming 
                                                                
214
 See, e.g., Evans v United Kingdom, supra n. 11 at para. 21.  
215
 Ibid. But, as emphasised by Harris et al., supra n. 43 at 343, as regards positive obligations ‘the process 
is to determine whether or not there is a right under the Convention’. By contrast, when it comes to 
interferences, ‘the individual’s right is already established’ and so it is for the state to demonstrate that the 
inference is justified. 
216
 Ibid. at para. 77. Compare the domestic courts who asked whether there had been an interference by the 
state with Evans’ right to respect for her private life. 
217
 Ibid. 
218
 SH and Others v Austria, supra n. 62 at para. 4. 
Murphy and Ó Cuinn, ‘Works in Progress: New Technologies and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 10(4) Human 
Rights Law Review 601-38 
48 
one (which was the outcome sought by her ex-fiancé), are both ‘particularly important 
facets’.  
Second, the margin will be wider where ‘there is no consensus within the Member 
States of the Council of Europe, either as to the relative importance of the interest at stake 
or as to the best means of protecting it, particularly where the case raises sensitive moral 
or ethical issues’.219 So, as we saw earlier, in Vo v France the Grand Chamber held that in 
the absence of any European consensus on the scientific and legal definition of the 
beginning of life, the issue of when the right to life begins comes within the margin of 
appreciation.
220
 In Evans a wide margin was afforded to the state both because ‘the use of 
IVF treatment gives rise to sensitive moral and ethical issues against a background of 
fast-moving medical and scientific developments’ and because the case raised questions 
which ‘touch on areas where there is no clear common ground amongst the Member 
States’.221 
A third factor affecting the breadth of the margin is whether the state has to strike 
a balance between competing private and public interests or Convention rights (‘the fair 
balance principle’).222 In Evans and SH and Others, which concerned laws regulating 
ARTs, the Court noted this factor, emphasising that the state’s wide margin in principle 
extends ‘both to its decision to intervene in the area and, once having intervened, to the 
detailed rules it lays down in order to achieve a balance between the competing public 
and private interests’.223  
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It would however be a mistake to assume that the Court is entirely hands-off: 
indeed, in SH and Others it reiterated that ‘differences in the approaches adopted by the 
Contracting States do not, as such, make any solution reached by a legislature 
acceptable’.224 A ‘blanket and indiscriminate’ approach is one solution that may draw 
criticism from the Court: so, for example, in S and Marper the Court was ‘struck by the 
blanket and indiscriminate nature of the power of retention [of bioinformation] in 
England and Wales’, and it insisted on ‘careful scrutiny’ of the retention regime 
regardless of the fact that ‘the level of interference with the applicants’ right to private 
life may be different for each of the three different categories of personal data retained’—
namely, fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles.
225
 It also gave short shrift to the 
state’s argument that, because the United Kingdom was a pioneer in the use of 
technology as a crime-detection tool, any comparison with other contracting states would 
be irrelevant.  
By contrast, in Evans, where the context was consent and ARTs, the Court 
endorsed a bright-line rule, noting that the relevant legislation was ‘the culmination of an 
exceptionally detailed examination of the social, ethical and legal implications of 
developments in the field of human fertilisation and embryology, and the fruit of much 
reflection, consultation and debate’.226 The absolute nature of the law—the fact that it 
could not be disapplied in any circumstance—was not, ‘in itself, necessarily inconsistent 
with Article 8’.227 Thus, citing both principle (specifically, ‘respect for human dignity 
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and free will, as well as a desire to ensure a fair balance between the parties to IVF 
treatment’) and strong policy considerations (promoting ‘legal certainty’ and avoiding 
‘problems of arbitrariness and inconsistency’ that would attach to a case-by-case 
approach), the Court chose to endorse the domestic law, finding that it neither upset the 
fair balance required by Article 8 nor exceeded the state’s wide margin of appreciation.228 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
The Court has observed, on many occasions, that the Convention is to be seen ‘a living 
instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’.229 That, to 
us, seemed a good omen as we commenced our new-technologies’ search of the Court’s 
case law. So, too, did the more prosaic fact that, as of 2009, the Court began 
communicating its interim measures via email.
230
 But the key question remains: did our 
hypothesis stand up to scrutiny? Did we find enough to be able to say that the Strasbourg 
Court is helping to frame the field of new technologies and human rights (or, more 
broadly, that of law and technology)?  
We put to one side the question of who, or what, might count as benchmark 
against which to judge the Court’s performance. We also put to one side the qualifiers 
that come as standard in any discussion of the Court. Those qualifiers—most notably, the 
Court’s focus on individual cases and, in particular, on the facts of each application—
certainly cannot be ignored; at the same time, however, there is a risk of becoming 
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consumed by them. So, having cleared these preliminaries, where do we stand? 
Essentially as follows: it would, first of all, be wrong—premature—to take a chance on a 
characterisation of the Court’s stance on new technologies. To quote the title of this 
article, the Court’s decisions in this area are best seen as ‘works in progress’; they give 
direction on individual complaints but taken together they do not allow for a full 
characterisation of the Court’s stance.   
That said, we can say that in this area there is evidence of more general trends— 
including the Court’s expansive approach to the interests protected by Article 8, its 
development of positive obligations and its apparent lack of enthusiasm for Article 12.
231
 
We have also seen plenty of evidence of classic concerns playing out in new-technologies 
mode. Thus, secret measures of surveillance, and more generally the use of new 
technologies in the criminal justice sphere (notably DNA databases), have been subject to 
robust scrutiny. Moreover, now that the EU Charter of Rights—which features an 
autonomous right to data protection—is part of the primary law of the Union, and the EU 
is to accede to the ECHR, we should expect that data protection will be major concern for 
European institutions in the coming years.
232
 We can expect, too, that there will be some 
states keen to clarify the position vis-à-vis DNA databases—specifically, if human rights 
compliance is to be secure, who and what can be in the database, for how long and for 
what purpose? And, clearly as part of this, the Court is likely to be called upon to 
elaborate how precisely it views the difference between DNA samples and DNA profiles, 
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and whether for example a population-wide database would be acceptable if it is just 
profiles that are retained.    
Non-discrimination, and protection of vulnerable groups, are other classic 
concerns that seem to be engaging the Court’s attention in this field: think, for example, 
of SH and Others v Austria,
233
 and the references to both ethnic groups and minors in S 
and Marper v United Kingdom.
234
 But, looking in particular at Evans v United 
Kingdom,
235
 it is also clear that non-discrimination can be awfully difficult terrain—
involving a clash of rights, in the context of hope, fear and personal tragedy, and a 
challenge to consent as the quintessential human rights-compliance measure. Another 
area needing fresh engagement is the obligations of wealthy, medically-advanced 
European states towards citizens of poorer countries. Work has commenced on the right 
to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, and as part of this there is 
likely to be new engagement with the obligation of international co-operation and 
assistance, and the effects of the current intellectual property regime. But that is not 
enough: as demonstrated by N v United Kingdom,
236
 where the Court made it clear that 
Article 3 does not bar a contracting party from returning a seriously ill individual to her 
or his country of origin unless there are ‘very exceptional circumstances’ involving 
‘compelling humanitarian considerations’, there is an urgent need for ongoing 
engagement with the complex question of our obligations towards both the nearby needy 
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and their distant counterparts.
237
 And, put bluntly, this is not something that European 
states and their citizens should be seeking to abdicate to the Strasbourg Court.   
If we shift from the difficult to the unexplored, ethics (or more narrowly 
bioethics) seems to be the stand-out omission in the search results. We did not anticipate 
this gap: quite the opposite—the legacy of Nuremberg, the negotiation of the Oviedo 
Convention and, more generally, the rise of ‘public bioethics’, meant that we had been 
expecting material that would allow us to identify the Court’s position on the relationship 
between bioethics and human rights. We had come across, but discounted, the advice 
given by representatives of the Court (in the context of Recommendation Rec(2003)10 of 
the Committee of Ministers concerning xenotransplantation) to the effect that the ECHR 
‘should be understood as a legal instrument aimed at securing individual rights and as 
such it may be of limited relevance to policy issues in the field of bioethics’.238 If this is 
the ‘official’ stance, we would ask why and also for how long can it survive? 
 Still, the search threw up positives too—most obviously, the cluster of 
‘environmental’ obligations stemming from Taşkın et al. The text of the ECHR doesn’t 
exactly prompt one to think in terms of environmental rights, so it was genuinely 
interesting to see the Court’s crafting of positive obligations from Articles 2 and 8.239 The 
platform the Court has created for the principle of public participation is particularly 
welcome—in part because of its ongoing reluctance to use Article 10 as the basis for a 
general right of access to information. On the precautionary principle, we did not find 
enough to say how it is likely to fare at Strasbourg; what we can say, however, is that the 
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principle is now on the Court’s radar. There is, moreover, a related point concerning lack 
of scientific consensus as a trigger for the margin of appreciation. We saw a controversial 
use of this trigger in Fretté v France,
240
 but we saw too that a different approach was 
taken in EB v France
241
 and, drawing on Goodwin (Christine) v United Kingdom,
242
 
wherein the Court stepped away from another standard trigger and indicated a willingness 
to act in the absence of a ‘common European approach’ to the issue at hand, we might 
speculate that something similar could happen in this context too. That move is, as they 
say, ‘one to watch’. On balance, we would say that the same advice is apt as regards the 
Court’s role as an actor in the field of new technologies and human rights. Put differently, 
this is a Court that is engaged in ‘works in progress’.  
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